Will Secular Religions continue in the future?



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Will Secular Religions continue in the future?
Will Secular Religions continue in the future?

John Rex,

Department of Sociology,

University of Warwick,

Coventry,

United Kingdom.

The title of this section of the conference is puzzling. The term secular religion is on the face of it and oxymoron. According to the Oxford dictionary the term has a number of meanings of which the main two are “concerned with the affairs of this world, not spiritual or sacred:” and “not concerned with religion or religious belief” Religion on the other hand is “belief in a superhuman controlling power especially in a personal God or Gods entitled to obedience or worship and the expression of this in worship “

Despite this there is now a widespread belief amongst sociologists of religion that the function previously performed by religious groups is now performed by other groups or organisations In order to understand this it will be useful first to look at the way in which religion is treated by the three great classical sociological theorists Durkheim, Weber and Marxi

Durkheim (1912) makes a basic distinction between the sacred and the profane world. The sacred world for him however turns out to be not a world of gods to be worshipped but rather society itself. Furthermore religious expression always occurs in group activity. There is no religion without a church. It does seem that it is easy from this point of view to see that religion is in its actual definition secular and equally that its functions may be performed by other groups or organisations like the Nation or the Party.

Max Weber emphasises the growing trend towards rationality within religion. Historically religions move from other-worldy mysticism to wordly asceticism represented especially by Calvinism (Weber 1993). Moreover there is a close relationship between the growth of rational calculating capitalism and the popular interpretation of the doctrine of predestination. (Weber 1910).

Marx’s understanding of religion is clearest in his argument with Feuerbach in the Theses on Feuerbach (Marx and Engels 1962). In the first Thesis Marx surprisingly rejects Feuerbach’s materialism and points out that idealism has shown a greater understanding of the notion of human activity. In the Fourth thesis he writes: that Feuerbach’s achievement “Consists in dissolving the religious world and revealing its secular foundations” but “the chief thing still remains to be accomplished. The fact that the secular foundation lifts itself above itself and fixates itself as an independent empire beyond the clouds can only be explained in terms of the internal division and contradictions of this secular foundation. The latter must be understood in its contradictions and then through the elimination of the contradictions revolutionised in practice. ….once the earthly family is discovered to be the secret of the holy family it must be theoretically criticized and revolutionised in practice” ii

In practical terms the rule of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union involved the suppression of religion and religious belief in favour of the belief system known as dialectical and historical materialism. Religious beliefs were thought of as the “opium of the people”iii In organisational terms the Communist Party replaced the organisation of the Church. It also had its own ceremonial displays. These facts made it possible for some sociologists to argue that Communism was the new secular religion.

Religion, however had older roots and continued to exist in all communities. In its simplest form it involved the extension of the bonds of kinship to unite the living and the dead. It was in fact one of the “primordial” bonds between men suggested by Geertz. These were kinship, neighbourhood or territory, shared language and shared religion. (Geertz 1963). But religion develops to include much more besides these elementary feeling of belonging It comes to involve a belief in god or gods who should be worshipped. It suggests a difference between the world as it is and as it should be and asked how human beings might be saved. It offers a diagnosis of the causes of human suffering. And it might form the basis for a moral code. All of these things are justified in terms of some kind of narrative such as is to found in the story of the life of Christ or Mohammed or in the story of the Hindu gods, of the priesthoods which they created and

subsidiary stories of the emergence of secondary teachers like the Sikh Gurus. Sociologists who themselves may have no religious beliefs have still to note as an empirical and historical fact that all cultures have such narratives in terms of which their members interpret their own experience.

Religion is not, however to be thought of as. something which pertains only to large groups. Churches break up into sets and individuals may have individual spiritual lives. Bryan Wilson has described some of the varieties of sects amongst Christians in his edited book Patterns of Sectarianism, (Wilson 1967). Each of the sects his contributors describe might be thought of as moves towards secularism. But there is also a place for sects like the Humanist Societies which are more definitely secular and for the Society of Friends in which individuals who have had direct individual spiritual experiences come together for Meetings.

It is politics rather than religion which binds human beings together on a larger scale (See Malesevics and Haugaard 2002) and to understand the meaning of this we have to turn to the arguments about nationalism which have gone on in England about the theory of nationalism. The leading figures in this debate are Gellner and Anthony Smith.

Gellner has been the major theorist of the modernising nation state. He sees this as the appropriate form of state in an industrial as contrasted with a traditional society. He describes it as follows:

The economy needs both the new type of central culture and the central state and the state probably needs the homogeneous cultural branding of its flock, in a situation in which it cannot rely on largely eroded sub-groups either to police its citizens, or to inspire them with that minimum of moral zeal and social identification without which social life becomes very difficult……The mutual relationship of a culture and a state is something quite new and springs inevitably from the requirements of a modern economy.
Thus all subordinate groups like classes and ethnies give way to the notion of citizenship. There is no place for religions other than the civic religion, and the educational system should be such that individuals learn flexible roles and can be moved from one position to another.

A very different view of the nature of nations is given by Anthony Smith. For him the origin of nations is to found in the formation of “ethnies”. These are fairly large groups of individuals bound together by symbols. When these ethnies become attached to a territory they become nations and this is indeed the origin of nations. Such groups clearly have a quasi-religious nature. (Smith 1981 and 1986). Guibernau has suggested that there can be nations without states (Guibernau 2002). On the other hand a collection of essays edited by Hobsbawm and Ranger suggests that what are claimed to be national traditions have been deliberately invented (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1992).

A new idea which has been applied to the situation of ethnics and of transnational communities is that of “imagined communities” arising from the growth of printed material which is attributed to Benedict Anderson (1991). Anderson’s account of the emergence of these communities is actually a very complex one in which he sees it as emerging first in the independence movements of Latin America, but there is no doubt some truth in the view that individuals identify not merely with their existing communities but with those which they imagine. Such identifications are a substitute for religion and may be thought of as being the new secular religion.
During the past five hundred years most people have been conscious of living in not simply in ethnic nations or modern nation state but in empires. In the earlier part of this period this took the form of the establishment of rule by a dominant nation over its neighbours as was the case in Britain where the English attempted to establish their rule over Wales, Scotland and Ireland. In other cases a nation conquered neighbouring nations or in the case of the West European countries rule over distant nations.

In an ideal and extreme form of empire the imperial power simply extends its rule through establishing its institutions amongst the subordinate people as though they too were subjects of the metropolitan state. Such unified control however is not usually possible. The actual actors who carry out the transformation of the subordinate nation are the soldiers, police, bureaucrats, economic entrepreneurs and missionaries inserted by the metropolitan power.

Whereas the world of the nineteenth an early twentieth century was a world organised and controlled by empires (the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, Tsarist and Soviet Communist Empires in East Europe and the overseas empires of Spain, Portugal, Britain, France, Holland and Belgium) the world of the late twentieth century was one in which the old imperial systems had been overthrown either because of their own economic or political weakness or through the resistance and growing power of the subject peoples. At this point the question arises of what types of social bond were likely to arise in the formerly subject areas. What we then see is the emergence of post-colonial nationalism as well as pressure upon the former settler communities and other agents of imperialism. The latter may find themselves in a very difficult situation expelled from their former privileged position yet not acceptable in what they see as their homeland.

Such shake-ups of the structure of former empires form the substance of contemporary politics. Thus we have the new independence of the former countries dominated by Russia such as Bulgaria and Romania and the break-up of the former Yugoslavia. The Balkan area becomes an arena of often violent ethnic conflict in which new forms of nationalism arise. These forms of nationalism are the substitute for religion or, one may say, constitute the new secular religion there. The matter is complicated by the fact that the different groups do have different religions in the simple sense including Catholic, Orthodox and Islam. Any of these can become the embodiment of the hew nationalism. I shall return to the role of Islam in a later section.

A question which is raised in relation to all these groups is whether they are “fundamentalist”. Fundamentalist can mean many different things. It may refer to strict adherence to scriptures; it may refer to rigid or fixed forms of behaviour; it may be taken as meaning readiness to use violence. In its different meanings it is applied to Christian groups in the United States or Europe and is commonly applied to Muslim movements. In other papers I have suggested that the term is misleadingly applied to such groups as Jamaa-i-Islami in Pakistan. What should concern us here, however, is that the term is seen as the opposite of flexibility of belief and practice and that this flexibility may sometimes be regarded as a “secular” form of the religion.

All that has been said so far refers to Eastern and Central Europe. The societies there have to deal with post-imperial problems and the forms of nationalist conflict to which they lead.. A different set of problems occurs in relation to modern West European societies.

In Western Europe one of the major changes which has occurred during the period since 1945 is the replacement of identification of individuals with classes and class struggle with their identification with citizenship. According to Marshall (1951) individuals in Britain first acquired legal equality, and then political equality through the extension of the franchise. A process was under way after 1945 in which a minimum of social equality was being achieved. This included the determination of wages and working conditions through free collective bargaining, the entitlement of all individuals to at least minimum standards of income during unemployment and ill health as well as minimum standards in housing, health services and the personal social services. Marshall was guided in drawing up this list by the work of Beveridge in the Beveridge Report (Beveridge 1942) and his book Full Employment in a Free Society, (Beveridge 1944) The concept of social citizenship implied some sort of Welfare State. One can see here a similarity between this and Gellner’s idea of the replacement of class loyalties by a common citizenship.

Marshall, however, did not deal with the question of ethnic minorities. This was a question which was raised by Roy Jenkins the British Home Secretary in an address to a conference of Non-Governmental Organisations arranged by the National Committee for Commonwealth Immigrants. Jenkins tried to define the term “integration” for Commonwealth immigrants in 1966 “not as a flattening process of uniformity, coupled with equal opportunity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance. (recorded in Joppke 2002). I have discussed this idea and its relation to Marshall’s concept of social citizenship in my book Ethnic Minorities in the Modern Nation State, (Rex 1996). It involves a specific view of what is called multiculturalism which has to be distinguished from other forms which do not relate it to the Marshallian conception of Social equality in the Welfare Stateiv

In discussing Jenkins definition I suggested that it implied the coexistence of what I called “two cultural domains”. On the one hand there was the civic culture based upon the Welfare State which all individuals had to accept; on the other there were the cultures of the separate ethnic communities who would continue to speak their own languages at home, who would practice their different religions and who would continue to adhere to their own customs vand family practices.

In fact the relationship between the two cultural domains is a difficult matter. There are those who allow no place for minority cultures as is the case in the French ideology which while insisting on the rights of all individuals to liberty, equal opportunity and fraternity has no place for the continuation of minority cultures. On the other hand there are those in minority groups who demand more than a limited role for their cultures seeking to practice it in its fullest and seeking to impose it in the public domain. They may be one kind of “fundamentalist”.

We should now turn to the special position of Islam and its place in Western European societies. A recent book edited by Shireen Hunter (Hunter 2002) is entitled Islam, Europe’s Second Religion, to which I contributed a chapter on Islam in the United Kingdom. In my chapter as in the other chapters of the book it is clear that Islam takes many forms ranging from its “fundamentalist” violent and separatist forms to the notion of Islam as capable of having a modern form. One of the outstanding spokesmen for a modernised form of Islam is Tariq Ramadan who has put the case for this is Europe and America (Ramadan 2003)

Reversed Mission’ and the ‘New’ Black Pentecostal Churches in the UK


Conference on Religion and Politics, June, South-West University, Blagoevgrad, Bulgaria, 3-4th June, 2005
Stephen Hunt

School of Sociology

University of the West of England

Bristol,

UK
Introduction

Pentecostal-type churches in the UK and elsewhere in the Western world, ‘planted’ from West Africa, are a new religious and cultural phenomena that constitutes an expression of ‘reversed mission’. While these Christian constituencies frequently lay claim to ‘revival’ and national up-turns in church-going, the revival is largely attributable to the founding of such churches and their immediate appeal to a distinct socio-cultural environment. Indeed, it is difficult to over-exaggerate the proliferation of these freshly established West African congregations and their implications for migrant ethnic and cultural enclaves.

The Redeemed Christian Church of God (RCCG) exemplifies such developments and has served as the basis of my on-going research in the UK. It is the largest and certainly most noteworthy in terms of congregational growth. In the mid 1980s the RCCG established its first church in the UK with a very small congregation. Some two decades later it has several dozen churches of varying sizes by way of regular attenders, although the collective membership nears some 200,000 people. These congregations are particularly well represented in London, but there also exists churches across many other major towns in the UK.

While scholarly work has been carried out on the growth of such churches in West Africa (Ojo 1980, 1988; Hackett 1990; Marshall 1991, 1993), very little research has been conducted regarding how the rapid growth of these churches across the globe translates into the local environments in the West (Hunt 2000, Hunt 2001, Hunt 2002a, Hunt 2002b). The observation I would derive from my own fieldwork surveys over a number of years is that there is much to concur with Jules-Rosette’s conclusion that developing countries are forming religious doctrines and praxis which bring a synthesis of indigenous and Western religious beliefs as part of the proliferation of New Religious Movements (NRMs). Often such movements, perhaps exemplified by events in Africa, can be interpreted in terms of the life experiences and interests of distinct and frequently emerging social groups (Jules-Rosette 1994). Such theological constructs may then be exposed to the multi-flow processes of ‘glocalization’ (Featherstone 1990) and subsequently come to appeal to localized communities.


The Nigerian Context: Origins and Developments

Pentecostalism is undoubtedly the dominant branch of Christianity in much of Africa. It has enjoyed rapid growth since the 1970s and has largely been spread by the missionary work of the ‘classical’ North American and European Pentecostal denominations. However, in recent years Pentecostalism has undergone significant transformations and enculturation. This is a repercussion of not merely dynamics within the movement across the globe, but wider socio-cultural and political changes discernible across black Africa.

The earlier African Pentecostal churches were distinguished by their doctrines that were not significantly at variant with those advanced by Western Pentecostal denominations. An emphasis was put on puritan personal ethics, on a retreat from this world, in strict sectarian forms. For this reason they came to be known as ‘holiness’ or ‘righteousness’ churches. Along with increased involvement by Nigerian students, ministries from the West helped to expand these churches. In turn, this allowed an impetus for the revitalization of Pentecostalism in the 1980s which, in several respects, was at a variance from that of previous decades in terms church structure, theology and value orientation.

In many respects the emerging movement proved to be genuinely home-spun. While North American ministries were particularly influential, Nigeria came to produce its own variety of churches in line with its cultural traditions that reflected the experience of its people within the context of their daily lives and immediate needs (Marshall 1993, 214). These churches took various expressions. Many amounted to syncretic variations typified by the ‘Aladua’ congregations of western Nigeria that appeared to embrace more overtly entrenched African beliefs and practices (Peel 1980). Another trend was the emergence of independent churches, sometimes referred to as ‘Charismatic’ in order to distinguish them from the earlier wave of Pentecostal churches.


The Redeemed Christian Church of God

The Charismatic stream in Nigeria is characterized by the Redeemed Christian Church of God (RCCG), besides others such as the Deeper Life Church. Beginning mostly in the interdenominational student groups of the newly-formed Nigerian universities the RCCG, like thousands of other non-denominational churches, it originally spread from the southern urban areas in the early 1980s (Marshall 1993, 217). Although its origins can be traced back to the 1950s, the RCCG’s rapid expansion is evidenced since the early 1980s during turbulent times in Nigeria. Of distinct structural style, the parishes have proved to be the centre for church ‘plants’ and subsequent evangelism and have largely been responsible for the spectacular success of the RCCG. Since 1981, some 2,000 parishes have been established in Nigeria and, subsequently, approximately a further thousand under its current leader, Enoch Adeboye.1

The growth of such independent churches as the RCCG can be attributed to a unique range of social and economic changes. Hence, as Marshall gives account, they constitute a popular response to the repressive state policies of military dictatorship which ruled (until 1999) over the country’s profound economic problems which had set in during the early 1980s. These churches offer new strategies of survival and the restructuring of personal and collective relationships against a backdrop of severe economic decline. They mark a reaction to the ever-changing difficulties, challenges and constraints of everyday life – not only those brought about by the political state but the broader economic and social conditions. Against this backdrop of economic and moral decline, the new churches, including the RCCG, brought a sense of community, work motivation, and a philosophy of self-help. They have also generated distinct doctrines related to purity and prosperity which have been replicated across the world wherever the RCCG has ‘planted’ churches, albeit channeled through a distinct social stratum of educated Nigerians.
Reversed Mission

The multi-complex nature globalization has allowed such churches as the RCCG to evangelize on a world stage and ‘plant’ churches in far-flung countries, including those in North America and Europe which had initially sent Christian missionaries to Africa. The desire to evangelize what is perceived by the Nigerian churches as the ‘dark continent’ of Europe, has inspired ‘planting’ of numerous congregations out of Nigeria by individual parishes in Lagos or other large urban areas. The RCCG has proved to be particularly enterprising in its evangelism. This can be gauged in terms of its rapid global dissemination. In January 1997 the RCCG could boast some 300,000 affiliated members. By the end of that year the membership had risen to 500,000. Membership of the church has now increased at such a rate that it is difficult to provide an approximation, although the RCCG’s own estimates places it as close to one million members globally.

It cannot be doubted that the RCCG has interpreted its mission to Europe as an act of God and Christian witness to largely secularized societies. Thus, the faith which was exported to the African continent in the heyday of colonialism is being returned with the fresh dynamics of enculturated Pentecostalism. Nonetheless, the churches in Europe, as in North America, have largely failed to win over white converts and remain primarily the focus of identity and the source of inspiration for Nigerian migrants, and fairly affluent and educated ones for that matter. By way of their social functioning, therefore, these churches are double coded in that they reflect developments in Nigeria on the one hand and, on the other, function in a constructive way for West Africans in what is, in many regards, an alien and marginalized environment.
Church Structure

Through my own survey into RCCG churches in the UK, it appears evident that RCCG churches can weld their membership into a collective which displays a keen sense of community.2 This compliments the prevailing ethos of self-advancement which permeates the theology of the RCCG. Typical of similar churches, it is clear that the RCCG attempts to eclipse the often stark social divisions of its membership. Tribal loyalty is the most obvious. To a degree this reflects the fact that racial and tribal discord has undoubtedly proved the greatest threat to Nigerian unity. In many RCCG fellowships the destructive loyalty to the tribe, whether Igbo, Yoruba, or other smaller grouping, is strongly discouraged. Similarly, the distinctions of social status according to economic, occupational and educational distinctions are played down in sites of diaspora. Hence, there is an egalitarian ethos that is stronger than that to be found in many Pentecostal congregations. Just as significantly, in terms of breaking with past loyalties, there is the matter of social distinction according to age and many RCCG churches in the UK break with tradition by eroding cultural deference by the young towards older people.

This egalitarian ethos is, to some extent at least, extended to females who constitute around two-thirds of the membership of the RCCG in the UK (table 1). The earlier ‘holiness’ churches of Nigeria, reflecting the philosophies of Western Pentecostal churches, constructed strict edits about women’s dress and usually confined women to the lower levels of church administration. The RCCG do not display such restrictions even if pastors are exclusively male. While emphasis is placed on the family as the centre of the woman’s responsibility, the typical endorsement of the withdrawal of women from the occupational sphere found in older Pentecostal churches is not evident.

Dissecting across this egalitarian orientation is the tendency for many churches such as the RCCG to be highly structured, well organized, and with a strong hierarchical ethos. While each church is semi-autonomous from the parent organization, close networks exist between all member churches and this pattern is reproduced in the UK. Many of these churches are pastured by respected charismatic leaders, a sizeable number of who are frequently successful university educated professional people. However, despite the emphasis upon strong leadership there exists significant opportunities to rise to prominent church position irrespective of occupational background, education, age or gender.

There are also many aspects of lay participation in the running of the church. In the RCCG congregations, a sizeable amount of church administration and pastoral care is given over to part-time, voluntary lay participation by men and women. Many churches have established nurseries and kindergartens, and while not providing practical medical services as do the churches in Nigeria, they offer ‘faith (healing) clinics’ and counseling services. In addition, they hold neighbourhood prayer groups, not only to encourage mutual faith, but to give guidance on financial and personal difficulties. Individual churches also sponsor members in a variety of educational and business endeavours, related in most cases to the running and propagation of the church and its assets: transport, publishing, crafts and trades.

Marshall interprets these self-help activities in the Nigerian context as indicating not only the ability of these church communities to develop institutional alternatives to social services lacking by the state, but as an increasing attempt at self-assertion (Marshall 1993, 39). It is the latter which is particularly relevant in the UK situation and must be primarily understood with the social location of the distinct composition of RCCG membership. The relevance of that membership will now be considered with reference to empirical data derived from questionnaire responses.



Social Composition of RCCG Churches

Despite the endeavour to win converts of different nationalities and ethnic groups in the UK, there is no mistaking the fact that the RCCG is a Nigerian church with a predominantly Nigerian congregation. Ethnicity and nationality seemingly appear to be the most obvious demographic considerations. In terms of ethnicity, 96 percent of respondents in my survey referred to themselves as ‘African’. By way of nationality, 90 per cent designated themselves as ‘Nigerian’. A further 7 percent were constituted by a number of other black African nationalities including those from Zambia, Ghana, Cameroon and Tanzania.

That the RCCG should display a largely young constituency in the survey is noteworthy (table 2). About 10 percent were under twenty years old, over 50 percent under the age of thirty, and some 93 percent under forty years old. This age profile is in clear relief to most churches in the UK which are formed by predominantly older age groups (Brierley 1989, 79-105). As far as occupation is concerned, the membership of RCCG is solidly middle-class (table 3). Of those working, 38 percent were in the higher professional occupations, and over 41 percent were made up of lower professionals. This is in marked contrast to earlier findings of black Pentecostal congregations which indicated that such churches are constituted by poor, lower-class manual groups (for example, see Anderson 1980; Ramdin 1987). Around 80 percent of those not in employment were students. Along with those in employment, they largely originated from wealthy background in Nigeria, The general profile, then, was of fairly affluent constituency of young people, a sizeable segment of which are students, or those who have not long graduated and who are developing their careers in the UK. In this regard, certain occupational groupings are over-represented: information technology, medicine, engineering, business and finance among them. It invariably follows that a good number of RCCG members hold good educational qualifications (table 4), notably degrees and professional credentials which are particularly relevant in the context in the competition in the occupational market in Nigeria.
Principal Doctrines

As suggested above, the recent development within Nigerian Pentecostalism involve innovating doctrines and teachings, as well as organizational arrangements, which address issues related to the profound economic and political difficulties encountered by Nigeria for some two decades. Thus many of the major doctrines are associated with the integrity of the family, sexuality, health, wealth and justice, as well as economic aspirations. If a generalization can be made, it is that the range of teachings espouse an apparently materialistic and work-orientated ethic, thinly disguised as theological dogma, which compliments, and sometimes contradict teaching of purity.

Teachings of purity are significant largely on two counts. Firstly, they dovetail with a form of Protestant work ethic which insists that everyday life of members must be void of lying, cheating, stealing, quarrelling, gossiping, bribing, and abstinence from alcohol. Secondly, the significance of purity must be seen in terms of boundary maintenance. The new wave of Pentecostal churches in Nigeria has long been symbolically separating its membership from the moral chaos of outer society by a strong emphasis on purity of lifestyle, strengthened and reinforced by mutually supportive communities. This affirms Gifford’s observation concerning the way that the new churches are linked to the elevation of social status and the forging of a distinct lifestyle in Nigeria. In sort, through the church communities members find shelter, psychological security and solidarity (Gifford 1994).

‘Divine prosperity’ teachings supplement those of purity. In the churches of the RCCG material success is not shunned. To some extent this reflects the impact of the USA-based ‘Faith’ ministries who teach that health and wealth is part of the salvation package of Christian believers (Gifford 1998). However, while finance and prosperity are to the fore, they are more likely to be advanced in terms of financial management. While it is certainly taught by the RCCG that God will materially bless the believer, considerable stress is also placed on the effort that individuals make to their own careers and self-advancement. Economic decline in Nigeria has precipitated the growth of such doctrines in that they reflect the increasing need to be frugal and motivated at a time of economic ravages. Such teachings have further resonance in the setting of the UK, where many members of RCCG churches are attempting to establish better living standards for themselves in a competitive occupational and educational marketplace.


Conclusion

At a time when the more traditional forms of Pentecostal churches (including those originating in the older Caribbean community), as well as the more mainline charismatic-type churches are generally stagnating, if not declining, the RCCH and other emerging churches constitute an expanding segment of contemporary Christianity in the UK. However, as explored above, the momentum for this growth is to be found in West Africa. In the UK they represent a deliberate attempt to create an ethnic enclave, to engender group solidarity, and to construct a refuge from wider society.

For the most part (some 70 percent according to the survey findings), members of the RCCG in the UK have joined the church as a result of networking through established family members, friends and work associates. The attraction of attending a church with those of the same ethnicity and nationality comes into clear relief. Settling as migrates in the UK, albeit temporarily, is thwart with difficulties. In response to the outside culture and demands of working and studying context of the UK church can be a place of refuge where a sense of identity is re-enforced and where adherence to a distinct set of doctrines supports a wider worldview. This often means distancing themselves from of the perceived failings of Nigerian society, as well as establishing boundary maintenance with UK culture.

In the future other wealthy Nigerians will probably continue to enter the UK to take their place in the academic system and the employment market. While they do so, the RCCG is a welcome home from home, one which encourages them to succeed in all aspects of their lives. If their stay is short-term, then the lack of deep integration becomes relatively unimportant. On return to their country of origin their isolated status will continue within the Pentecostal communities and within the high ranking jobs and status to which they aspire. In this respect, the long-established link between religion, ideal interests, and ideas, so effectively explored by Max Weber (1965), would seem to be made manifest.


Notes

1 Enoch Adeboye’s leadership has followed that of the RCCG’s founder, Pa Josiah Akindayomi.


2. This survey was based on research conducted into the largest RCCG in the UK, ‘Jesus

House’, the ‘flagship’ congregation.


________________________________________'>Tables: Demographic Features of RCCG Membership in the UK

(percentages of sample of 712 respondents)

______________________ _______________

Table 1 Gender Table 2 Age

______________________ _______________

% %


Female 71.2 Under 21 10.4

Male 28.7 21-30 51.4



______________________ 31-40 31.0

100 41-50 4.5

51 + 2.7

_________________

100
_________________________________________ _________________________________

Table 3 Occupation Table 4 Education

_________________________________ _________________________________

% %

1. Managers/Administrator 4.5 Professional Qualification 9.6



2. Professional 20.3 Higher Degree 7.9

3. Associate Professional/Technical 17.9 Degree 48.7

4. Clerical/Secretarial 10.1 Certificate/Diploma 16.7

5. Craft/Skilled Manual 0.3 ‘A’ level 10.4

6. Personal/Protective Services 5.6 GCSE 2.5

7. Sales Occupations 4.2 None/Unclassified 4.5

8. Plant/Machine Operatives 2.2 ________________________________

9. Other Occupations 1.1 100

Not working 34.8

(of which 79% are unemployed)



______________________________________

100


References

Anderson, R. (1980) ‘Visions of the Disinherited: The Making of American Pentecostalism’, American Historical Review, 87: 145-62.

Brierley, P. (1989) Christian England, London: MARC Europe.

Featherstone, M. (1990) ‘Introduction’ to M. Featherstone (ed), The Global Culture, London: Sage.

Gifford, P. (1994) ‘Some Recent Developments in African Christianity’, African Affairs, 93: 513-34.

Hackett, R. (1990) ‘Enigma Variations: The New Religious Movements in Nigeria Today’, in A. Wallis and R. Shanks (eds), Exploring New Religious Movements: Essays in Honour of Harold W. Turner, Mission Focus: Elkhart, 32-47.

Hunt, S. (2000) 'The "New" Black Pentecostal Churches in Britain', CESNUR, 14th Conference, University of Latvia, Riga, Latvia, 30th August, published on www.cesnur, 2000.

Hunt, S. (2001) 'The British Black Pentecostal "Revival": Identity and Belief in the "New" Nigerian Churches', Ethnic and Racial Studies, 24 (1): 104-24.

Hunt, S. (2002a) 'The Redeemed Christian Church of God. Black Church Revival in the UK', Pneuma, Journal of the Society for Pentecostal Studies, 24 (1): 62-74.

Hunt, S. (2002b) '"Neither Here Nor There": The Construction of Identities and Boundary Maintenance of West African Pentecostals', Sociology, 36 (1): 147-69.

Jules-Rosette, M. (1994) ‘The Features of African Theologies – Situating New Religious Movements in an Epistemenological Setting’, Social Compass, 41 (1): 49-65.

Marshall, R. (1991) ‘Power in the Name of Jesus’, Review of the African Political Economy, 52: 21-37.

Marshall, R. (1993) ‘”Power in the Name of Jesus”: Social Transformation and Pentecostalism in western Nigeria’, in T. Ranger and O. Vaugn (eds), Legitimacy and the State in Twentieth-Century Africa. Essays in Honour of A. H. M. Kirk-Green, Basingstoke: McMillan.

Ojo, M. (1980) ‘The Contextual Significance of the Charismatic Movements in Independent Nigeria’, Africa, 58 (2): 23-37.

Ojo, M. (1988) ‘”Deeper Life Christian Ministry”: A Case Study of the Charismatic Movement in Western Nigeria’, Journal of Religion in Africa, 18 (2): 17-28.

Peel, J. (1980) Aladura: A Religious Movement Among the Yoruba, London: Oxford University Press.

Ramdin, R. (1987) The Making of the Black Working Class in Britain, London: Gower.




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