Bg комисия на европейските общности брюксел, 11. 2007 com(2007) 651 окончателен съобщение на комисията

Such a system should include the establishment of a Standing Committee of Experts tasked with identifying the risks associated with various precursors and recommending appropriate actions to the Commission. The Committee should consider and/or monitor the following issues:

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  Development of suitable additives and promotion of the use of these additives to precursors in order to prevent their use in explosives, when it is technically possible.
  
• 
  Restrictions on concentration concerning the sale of certain precursors to end-users.
  
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  A complete ban on concentrated strong acids to EU consumer markets (non-professional markets) when a substitute giving an equal use is technically possible: sulphuric, hydrochloric and nitric acids in particular.
  
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  Introduction of a voluntary market surveillance scheme for ammonium nitrate fertilizers and restricting the sale of high nitrogen fertilizers to the general public.
  
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  Limiting the availability of pure nitromethane to the general public. It should be available to industrial customers via a suitable customer qualification scheme.
  
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  Restrictions on access of the general public to unphlegmatized sodium chlorate (weed killer).
  
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  The feasibility and added value of introducing a complete ban on selling certain precursors to minors.
  

In order to avoid duplicating existing measures or adding unnecessarily to the burden faced by legitimate business, it is important that account is also taken of existing controls on similarly sensitive items. Trading in explosive materials, such as acetone, hydrochloric and sulphuric acid is already covered by the existing Community drug precursor legislation. This legislation offers effective controls and must be taken into consideration before new mechanisms are proposed. To be effective controls will have to apply to imports, exports, transit and intra-Community movements.

Ongoing

The relevant quantities and/or concentrations would be set based on the work of the Standing Committee of Experts.

Assess the need to setup a concrete system by end 2008

It should not be in conflict with other Regulations.

Simple means should exist for anyone within the supply chain to alert the relevant national authority if they see a transaction or theft which they suspect to have been made with the intention of illegally fabricating explosives.

A binding system could be considered concerning the notification to the relevant national authority of any transactions involving the products on the list which can be considered suspicious. A “code of conduct”, similar to the EC code for drug precursors, should be developed, for industry and retailers, identifying the behaviours which may give rise to suspicion.

Assess the need to setup a concrete system by end 2008

The possibility of designing a European symbol to indicate that the product for retail sale is subject to registration could be considered.

This shall apply to companies as well as to non-commercial activities.

The lack of any harmonised approach towards licensing schemes to handle large quantities of pyrotechnic articles means that it is possible to handle such materials without regulatory oversight as long storage and transport requirements are met. Such a security gap should be closed.

Ensure that the levels of necessary access prevention and detection provisions in fixed storage facilities should be proportional to the risk and should be subject to a standard classification.

Ongoing

Response plans should be developed tuned to the level of alert present.

This applies to all factories manufacturing bulk explosives. The relevant periods should not be long so that any losses, thefts and inconsistencies are recognized as quickly as possible.

The following specific actions should be undertaken:

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  The amount of explosives produced on MEMUs should be ascertained by two independent systems. At least one of these should be fitted on the truck.
  
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  Each MEMU should be fitted with process locks to prevent unauthorised use.
  
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  Loaded MEMUs should be parked on a site which is guarded or monitored when they are not in use.
  

These security solutions include:

1. 
   be fitted with 24 hour, remote monitoring systems (e.g. GPS based systems), that are monitored by an appropriately resourced monitoring station. The Monitoring systems (including the Monitoring Station) must reliably enable where technically possible:
   

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  Vehicle location to be identified
  
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  Alarm activation if vehicle is moved from specified location at certain times
  
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  Alarm activation if specified compartments are opened at certain times and/or at unauthorised locations
  
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  A duress and/or a panic alarm facility
  

2. 
   be capable of immobilising the engine remotely if safe and applicable subject to the Vienna Convention
   
3. 
   be fitted with an anti theft system
   
4. 
   have sufficiently secure compartments for explosives
   
5. 
   be fitted with a means of communication
   
6. 
   have a recognised marking affixed to the roof of the vehicle, to a specified size and description.
   

This should be done with a view to making sure that future transport regulations (GHS-system) continue to cover such substances.

End 2007

The working group would be composed of Member State and Commission representatives.

These standards should be updated as technology evolves

For airport security, this should complement the obligations for training security staff set out in §12.2 of the Annex to the EU Regulation 2320/2002 establishing common rules in the field of civil aviation security.

The database(s) would target specifications of explosives needed by the forensic community and by the experts on detection.

The handbook would be classified at an appropriate level.

Under the scheme relevant authorities and institutes would be able to exchange test results.

Such a system should be supported by an EU programme and should allow for conducting performance trials under realistic conditions in same or similar scenarios.

Further developments in this field should be supported. The situation should be evaluated and assessed on a continuous basis, and updated as the need arises.

The system should facilitate information sharing and trust building. It should contribute to the identification of best practice, the organisation of joint training exercises, and keeping EOD units up to date concerning the latest developments of relevance to the sector.

The network should be made available to all EOD-Units (police, governmental and military) dealing with explosives with the MS.

The use of EU funding to establish the network should be assessed.

Such exchange would assist EOD experts and could take place through the EOD network.

In a situation where there are reasons to believe that mobile phones will be used as firing switches, the responsible law enforcement authorities should be able to request providers to shut down relevant antennas.