UNIATISM – MODUS VIVENDI OR A SERIOUS ECCLESIOLOGICAL PROBLEM IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EASTERN AND WESTERN CHRISTIANS

UNIATISM – MODUS VIVENDI OR A SERIOUS ECCLESIOLOGICAL PROBLEM IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EASTERN AND WESTERN CHRISTIANS

Michaela Moravčíková,

Institute for State-Church Relations, Bratislava, Slovakia

In this lecture, when speaking of Eastern Christians we mean adherents of Eastern Orthodox Churches, and by Western Christians we understand adherents of the Catholic Church of Latin and other rites. A discord between East and West started in the 5^th century, in the period of christological disputes, underpinned by an anti-imperial policy that lead churches in Armenia, Persia, and later in Ethiopia to a schism. The landmark of a split between Western and Eastern - Byzantine ecclesiology can be found in the Novellae of Justinian (527-562) by which he introduced the so-called pentarchy, i.e. he divided the Church into five patriarchates, the Western – Roman Patriarchate, and four Eastern ones: Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem. The patriarchates were mutually independent. A person of the Emperor guaranteed the unity of the Church, similarly as the figure of the Pope in the West. A mutual excommunication of both the Patriarch of Constantinople Michael Cerularius and the Papal legate Humbert of Moyenmoutier in 1054 became the visible symbol of a schism between Western and Eastern Churches. Filioque, the Papal primacy and a further dogmatic, legal and ritual differences deepened the schism even more.

In history, there were made more attempts to re-unite the Church: the Council of Lyons in 1274, the Council of Florence in 1439 with Greeks, Armenians and Jocobites, later on the Union of Brest with Belarussian and Ukrainian Orthodox believers in the Polish-Lithuanian Monarchy in 1595, and in 1646, the Union of Uzhorod with Ruthenian Orthodox believers in the Kingdom of Hungary. There arouse so-called Uniate Churches, particular churches legally subordinated to the Pope in Rome. They were observing their own Eastern rite, and were a part of the particular right. They remain part of the Catholic Church up to now. Such an union, however, has not constituted a feasible link between the Eastern and Western Christianity, yet it has lead to a partial latinization and absorption of the East by the West.

On a global level, the Catholic-Orthodox dialogue started in 1980. In spite of the manifold affinity of both of these confessions, it puts an example of the hardest search for a common expression of the content of the Christian faith so far. Uniate churches represent one of the most problematic issues of this dialogue for sure. They are vivid communities with their own troubled history - especially during the Communist era, with their specific common law and tradition, and with their own vision of the future, often differing absolutely from that of the chief representatives of the Orthodox Churches and the Holy See.

Milan Chautur (1997), a Greek-Catholic Exarch from Košice, Slovakia claims: "When we speak today about the unity of the church, when we seek the model of the unification, the Greek-Catholic church with its century-long effort for achieving unity can become a great proof that unity is possible, but not without good will and suffering"³

Ilja Nazarov (2005) writes about "an unfortunate attempt of the Union of Lublin in 1569 and the tragedy of the Union of Brest in 1596, which caused the lapse of the majority of the Halich population from the world Orthodoxy"⁴

E. D. Theodorou(1992), an Orthodox theologist claims: "The Orthodox think that the disestablishment of the union would mean the implementation of an exhortation by Paul VI, who emphasized in Constantinople that shepherds of the churches have to accept and respect each other as shepherds of that part of the herd, which Christ entrusted them, [...] they should avoid being provoked to confusion and misunderstanding by any means.⁵

On the other hand, P. Ambros(1994), a Catholic theologist, writes that "also Uniate churches seek their face [...] and attempt to live their full tradition in the middle of large, theologically, materially and spiritually well-established Latin church"⁶

Robert Taft (2002), professor at the Pontifical Oriental Institute in Rome offers a more complex evaluation. He claims that separation from the West through schisma and the influence of Islam caused that Eastern churches definitively developed into enclaves of the national particularism, in which ordinance, faith, culture and nationalism became a complex unity within the national church as the stronghold of the national and cultural independence. [...] In the West the pragmatic strategy of latinization occured as a result of unilateral development of Catholicism. [...] The Latin approach actually became Catholic, even though Easteners, who returned to unity and maintained their ordinance, kept in fact only very few of their differences. [...] With the prevalence of the Latin world, which was a historical reality, the Catholic church began to display itself not as a church communion, [...] but as a firmly organized and highly centralized European institution.⁷

Orthodox theologist M. Lossky(1992) seems to attempt for still more complex and a bit more optimistic commentary. He says that "From the point of view of statistics the presence of Orthodox Christians and their hierarchy in 'non-Orthodox' countries, like the existence of Eastern Catholic Churches in traditionally Orthodox regions have no ecclesiological significance other than showing the reality of the division between the Catholics and the Orthodox. However, from the dynamic point of view and from the point of view of history [...] the scatteredness of the Orthodox around the world, as well as the existence of Catholics of the Eastern rite is an invitation for a joint reflexion, purification, in the light of a common tradition, for the concept of the ecclesiology on both sides. Thus it is joint, i.e., ecumenic work." ⁹

In 1993 a document Uniatism, Method of Union of the Past and the Present Search for the Full Communion ¹³ was created in Balamand. It again rejects union as the method of unification, as it contradicts the mutual traditions of churches. It describes the unions, which have been established in the past four centuries as partial unions. It claims that these initiatives brought separation of the communion with their mother Eastern churches and escalated the division between the Eastern and Western Church. At the same time it declares that Eastern Catholic Churches being a part of the Catholic communion have the right for existence and operation. This right in the document is justified by their role – to respond to the needs of their believers. After the initial Catholic defense, the document continues with a different view, where it reminds forced "return" of Uniates to their mother church. These are tragic moments of the contemporary religious history, mainly due to the brutality of communist governments, which focused on those who rejected re-orthodoxization. Individual Uniate churches have their saints – martyrs from this period.

Both Catholic and Orthodox churches discover themselves here again as sister churches, ¹⁴, the reunification of which should not be either absorption or fusion. This document includes practical instructions, which require avoiding any triumphalism based on the suffering from the past. A significant space is given to respecting the religious freedom. Mainly in conflict situations the believers should have an opportunity to express their choice and to make decision which community they want to belong to without any pressure from outside. Organizing social help should be such, that it could not rise any suspicion from the hidden proselytism. Organizing pastoral projects which could also affect believers of the other church should not be carried out without consultations with representatives of the other church. It is also recommended to establish local committees, which would solve concrete problems at the local level, or pass them to a higher body (a mixed committee). The document mentions the need to educate future priests and all those, who are involved in pastoral activities. First they should be informed about the apostle succession of the other church and about the genuineness of its sacral life. It is also necessary to attempt for a mutually consulted, or, if possible, a mutual historiography of both churches. It especially encourages to solve the property issues by means of a brotherly dialogue. Restitutions should not be based only on the current situation or only on legal principles. The document encourages to take into account the complexity of the pastoral situation and local conditions. In the conclusion the committee rejects any proselytism and any expansion of Catholics at the expense of the Orthodox Church in the future. It also hopes that this removed the obstacle, which forced some autocephalous churches to delay their participation in the theological dialogue.
Documents and practice
Several documents have been created (the document from Balamand can be considered the key one), however, the question is what is their significance? What chances do these joint expressions of hope of theologists have to be implemented in individual churches? They are not the work of church authorities. In case of the Catholic Church they are not the work of its magisterium, in case of the Orthodox they are not the work of bishop synods, but they are the work of experts. They are considered to be expert reports, and, in general, certain fatigue from too abstract expressions of faith reigns. ¹⁵

On one hand documents are created as the result of an ecumenical consensus of both involved sides, on the other hand we frequently encounter blaming each other. It is mainly the Orthodox Church that complains about the implementation of proselytism and an interference into its jurisdiction. "The proselytism, mainly among baptized Orthodox children who attend kindergarten, is one of the greatest obstacles in ecumenism",¹⁶, said Alexei II, the Patriarch of Moscow in an interview for the Italian agency ANSA on 10^th of May, 2006. The Catholic Church faces charges of proselytism mainly from the Russian Orthodox church. The mistrust further increased after the Pope John Paul II established four Catholic dioceses ¹⁷ in Russia in 2002.

The issue of an argument over the canonical territory seems to be one of the key issues, even though the Catholic Church has not oficially verbalised it expressively yet. The Catholic Church stopped claiming the West is its canonical territory and does not give negative comments on the establishment of Orthodox parishes and dioceses in the Western Europe. Despite the fact that Vienna has been the seat of the Catholic bishop since the first millenium, it has no objections against Russian Orthodox metropolitan who is using the title 'Metropolitan of Vienna'. In the spirit of tolerance it accepts the neighbourhood of Orthodox bishops and priests in West-European urban centers. The secularized society of the Western Europe would not tolerate a different approach, anyway. However, at the same time it realizes that Orthodox clerics do not come to occupy the historical canonical territory, but to serve the believers who migrated to the West. A similar approach is also expected from the Orthodox Church.

Shift, however, can be seen also on the Orthodox side. Several years ago the Patriarch Alexei II supposedly stated that a true Orthodox Christian must not even go mushrooming to the same forest as Catholic.¹⁸ In May (18^th of May, 2006) the Pope Benedict XVI admitted Kiril, the Metropolitan of Smolensk and Kaliningrad. The Metropolitan Kiril emphasised the great impression created by Ratzinger as an autonomous and strong theologist with a discipline of thinking and speaking. The presented topics upon which both of them agreed included family, bioethics and human morality. Next day the Metropolitan Kiril consecrated the construction of the first Russian Orthodox church ¹⁹ in Rome, which is being constructed near Vatican. On the eve of this event the Cardinal Roger Echegaray visited the performance of the Sretensky Monastery Choir from Moscow on the Via conciliazione in Rome and claimed that Russia deserves to be called "Saint Russia" for centuries. ²⁰ The Patriarch Alexei II expressed himself that "repeated statements of Benedict XVI that he wants to strengthen the relationships with the Orthodox Church raise hope for better development, he, however, expects specific actions to solve the existing problems" ²¹.

The way to unity has achieved another milestone, in the form of 14-point joint declaration signed by Benedict XVI and the Constantinople Patriarch Bartholomew I on the last day of November 2006 in Istanbul, Turkey. In a spirit of common Christian heritage, both representatives turned attention to the contemporary world suffering from poverty, wars and terrorism. Equally, they confirmed their common vocation to support the respect for rights of every individual created to God's image and likeness. The Patriarch proposed the possibility to the Pope of joint inauguration of the mixed theological committee in Italy's Ravenna in 2007.

4-day long December's visit of the head of the Greek Orthodox Church Christodoulos to Vatican has been significant due to the signature of a common declaration. In the document, both Church representatives called upon mutual dialogue. They confirmed their disapproving attitude to abortion and euthanasia. In their speeches, they warned against the threat of growing secularism in the modern European society and emphasized the need for protection of Christian values in the EU countries.

Both sides, Catholic and Orthodox Church, identically state that unions and the violent re-orthodoxization in the period of Communism were also the result of the non-church, political and power interests. Looking for a consensus on the history is less successful. At present we can speculate how international politics affects the Catholic and Orthodox dialogue ²². Let us recall the invitation of the Pope to visit Russia by M. Gorbachev in 1989, later repeated by B. Yeltzin in 1991 and V. Putin on his visit to Rome shortly after being elected president of Russia. Even though the visit never took place due to a disapproving attitude of the Orthodox Church, both Kremlin and the Holy See share the same opinion on many international and political issues, such as the Middle East (there opinion is completely the same). Also the Patriarchy of Constantinople often has a similar opinion on the politics of the European Union as the Holy See.

It seems that the Catholic-Orthodox ecumenical dialogue is a long shot. The free environment where it takes place is paradoxically one of the factors that will extend it. None of the sides has full control over all its components. The dialogue will be extended mainly by extreme wings on both sides (apparently in good faith) by means of their declarations, actions and personal attitudes of individuals. It will be moved forward by moderate and open factions. We can expect that the East will probably have to accept the form of the West that developed in the course of the second millenium and the fact that a significant number of Catholics and their own religious way of living is present in the East. We can expect that the West will consider the synodal structure, and in the matter of the Pope primacy it will not demand from the East more than existed in the first millenium. ²⁵ The final result should be the communion of sister churches, like the one before the schism.

Admitting a certain degree of simplification, it is possible to be stated that the sixties of the twentieth century are, within the frame of theological concepts, characterized by the emergence of theology more focused on public matters. It also glosses and tries to create the correctives of various activities, focused on exercising of mostly social, but also political interests. On the European continent, the Political Theology appears, in Latin America, the same applies for the Liberation Theology. Various reflections, focusing their attention on practice of Christian belief mostly there where suppression of certain groups of people towards the fringe of society occurs, originate in other places.

In 1967, Johann Baptist Metz, a German theologian, used the term Political Theology in the program manifest of the conference in Toronto. This term described a new theological project, later implemented into the frame of church-world relations, which was understood as a social reality in its historical realization .²⁷ Metz created a concept of political theology, a line of thought, which intends to be a conscious as well as critical corrective of certain immanent trends of current church Christianity toward timeless, even yet socially ineffective private or culturally unacceptable understanding of meaning of the key points of Christian belief. He followed his teacher, Karl Rahner, whose implicitly included idea of theology anchored in the real life practice was emphasized and put in the first place by Metz. This is the real interest in faith practice from the perspective of the poor, suffering and modern enslaved. At the same time, it is necessary that the church theology is not bound by an arrogant ethno-centrism, or religiously conditioned euro-centrism, and blinded by a mono-centric ‘own’ truth. ²⁸

Metz himself defines the Christian belief, resulting from the scheme of his political theology as the practical fundamental theology, as a “practice of Christians in the history and society, which is understood as the sympathetic hope in Lord Jesus, the God of all living and dead, who calls all to become subjects in front of Him”.²⁹ He presents the vision of an anamnetic culture – the culture of a memory,³⁰ which means a lasting reminiscence of the challenge to change the history and liberate the human being. For Metz, this is an inevitable condition of faith and freedom and he projects it onto his concept of the cultural-poly-centric church.

Political theology, included in the “theology of the world”, has a critical and liberalizing mission, which shall be accomplished by means of defense of an individual, criticism of ideologies, mobilization of critical power of love, which exists in the center of Christian tradition. The feedback to the political theology supports new consciousness within the church and the need for transformation of relations between the church and the modern society.³¹

The above mentioned Metz’s Toronto program manifest assigns two different tasks to political theology. One of them is negative, known as pars destruens, and the other is positive, known as pars construens. The negative task consists in a corrective criticism confronted with the tendency of theology towards privatization. Political theology shall work in a sense of de-privatization of theology and solve the problem of reduction of the faith and its practice on private “non-secular” life of an individual. The positive task consists in developing public and social consequences of Christian heritage and a new relationship between the theory and practice in the framework of theology. This task is peculiar for theology, because eschatological promises of Biblical tradition such as freedom, justice, or peace have a public dimension. The Christ’s cross does not stand only in the private area, nor does it stand in the sacral area, but “outside”; “scandal and promise of this redemption have been a public matter ever since.”³²

Subsequently, Metz in his work Theology of the World, elaborates another category of the political theology, which he calls an eschatological reservation. This means eschatological promises of Christian theology, perceived in relation to a historical present, where this relation is considered to be a critical-dialectical one. Each eschatological theology must then become also a political theology as a critical theology of the society.

Jürgen Moltmann, one of the most influential present German Lutheran theologians, became another very significant personality of political theology. He points out the need to move from a limited horizon of the existential history towards a broader horizon of the history of the world. The hermeneutic horizon then becomes not the history of an individual, but the history of the world. Moltmann speaks about the political hermeneutics, because he perceives politics as a broad horizon of the human life. According to him, the eschatological theology, which elaborates the project of political theology, comes to the foreground. Within the frame of this project, God is presented as God of Hope. Eschatology is the teaching of hope on what one can hope for and at the same time it is the teaching of the practice of hope, which implements the hoped-for future into the center of present suffering. Hence, a human being is not only an interpreter of the future but also a co-operator of the future.

Christian eschatology then becomes an anticipation that this world will be changed at the end of days. However, it is possible to change this world already today, in the light of promised future. This, at the same time, supports the growth of the active hope, which searches possibilities for a change and anticipates a future “Heavenly Kingdom”³³

In his work Theology as Eschatology, Moltmann agrees with Metz. He calls ethics of hope, coming from the faith, the political theology - to prove that ethics is not only an appendix of dogmatics. Hence, it is not only a consequence of the faith, but the faith itself has a messianic character, in which it gains all its nature. The theology itself always exists in a certain political dimension, which makes it important. The theology of hope then broadens into a program of political theology, which projects acts of hope of the Christian community. So, according to Moltmann, the roots of political theology can be found in the “theology of hope”.³⁴

Almost immediately after the formulation of the term ‘political theology’, many discussions started. The critics pointed mostly to pagan ancient times, or Constantine-like political theology, which was on service of the state as its religious legitimization. Terms such as negative theology, critical-social theology, social theology, or dialectical theology were suggested in these discussions. Reflecting the semantic incorrectness and misunderstandings, Moltmann stated more precisely that the suggested program of political theology shall be understood as a program of a new political theology. It does not work as an ancient political religion, nor as modern civil religions, but it is based on the theology of hope, whose basic thesis is the Christian eschatology. Political theology defined like this then, according to Moltmann, fulfils the critical function in relation to power and ideologies and has to lead to the policy of liberation of the oppressed and those, who are pushed towards the fringe of society.

Political theology takes over the role of the critical confrontation with a modern society, and this confrontation is practical. The project of the political fundamental theology ³⁵ is then divided into three basic categories: 1. Memory – it is mostly the content of the Christian memory, which is set in motion in a particular situation. Metz speaks of dogma as of the “practical memory”. It is the memory, which criticizes present, evokes the hope, opens the horizons of future and calls for action. 2. Narration – it is a content of memory and needs to be re-told. In the post-narrative era, a return to narration is declared. Political theology is, in this sense, a synthesis of doxography, biography, argumentative and narrative theology. 3. Solidarity – is mystically-political, by means of which memory and narration are practiced. This solidarity originates on the basis of memory and on the narration of the story of Jesus Christ and is practiced in the history and society, where it should be a commitment of each human being to become and remain a subject. Hence, one speaks of mystically-political planetary solidarity, which includes also solidarity with the dead and the victims as well as the history of human suffering. The backwards solidarity with dead victims was developed mostly by Jewish philosophers reflecting a history of their nation as a history of suffering. Johann Baptist Metz says: “There exists not only the ‘forwards solidarity’ with the future generations, but also the ‘backwards solidarity’ with those who were silenced by death and with forgotten; for the backwards solidarity there exists not only the ‘revolution forwards’, but to a certain extent, also the ‘revolution backwards’ – in favor of the dead and their suffering. It has not only the viewpoint of the winners, the successful ones and those with great career, but also of the defeated ones and victims in the big theater of the world, where our history takes place.”³⁶

Political theology has in mind the confrontation with the modern era, but at the same time it represents the overcoming of the theology of secularization, at the time when the political theology proposes a concrete intermediation between the faith and the secular world. It introduces one dimension of the Christian theology and materializes in various cultural and social contexts, whether it is the Liberation Theology in Latin America, the Asian Theology, the Minjung Theology in Korea, the African Theology, the Black Theology in America, or the Feminist Theology,³⁷ which certainly deserve attention because they turn their attention to the places where suppression, humiliation, forcing out and suffering occur.