"Хуманитарните войни и новият интервенционализъм в контекста на колективната система на ООН за поддържане на международния мир"

Заключение

Използвана литература

Bertrand, M. The UN as an Organization. A Critique of its Functioning.

Capps, W. The Kantian Project in Modern International Legal Theory.

Cassesse, A. Ex inuria ius oritur: Are We Moving towards International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?

Chesterman, S. Just War or Just Peace.

Falk, R. The United Nations and the Rule of Law .(1994)

Freudenschuss, H. Between Unilateralism and Colective Security: Authorizations od the Use of Force by the UN Security Council.

Glennon, M. The New Interventionism: The Search for a Just International Law.

Gray, C. From Unity to Polarization: International Law and the Use of Force against Iraq.

Henkin, L. Kosovo and the Law of “Humanitarian Intervention”.

Joyner, D. The Kosovo Intervention: Legal Analysis and a More Persuasive Paradigm.

Krisch, N. Legality, Morality and the Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention after Kosovo

Lobel, J., Ratner, M. Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous Authorizations to Use Force, Cease-Fires and the Iraqi Inspection Regime. (1999)

Mertus, J. Legitimizing the Use of Force in Kosovo

Melvern, L. The Security Council: Behind the Scenes.

Murphy, S. Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law.

Shreuer, C. The Waning of the Souvereign State: Towards a New Paradigm for Interantional Law?

Reisman, M. Unilateral Action and the Transformations of the World Constitutive Process: The Special Problem of Humanitarian Intervention.

Simma, B. NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects.

Simpson, G. The Situation on the International Legal Theory Front: The Power of Rules and the Rule of Power.

Sur, S. The State Between Fragmentation and Globalization.

Tsagorias, Jurisprudence of International Law: Humanitarian Dimension.

Tuck, R. The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant. (1999)

Walt, S. International Relations : One World, Many Theories.

Wheeler, M. Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society.

Приложение: Interventions after the Cold War

Some commentators argue that the term intervention should cover the deployment of both solicited and unsolicited military force. Here, however, the emphasis is only on the unsolicited type, defined as the absence of effective consent. This absence is clearest when there is explicit opposition from the government (in Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda). Because the existence of de facto control is generally the most important criterion in dealing with a regime as representing the state, 2 consent was controversial and of little practical meaning in several cases (Liberia, Haiti, and Sierra Leone) and irrelevant in one case (Somalia). The case of East Timor is included because consent was ambiguous – it emanated from an illegal occupying power, after significant international pressure that verged on coercion.

The second general criterion is the prominence of a humanitarian justification employed by intervening states. The definition of humanitarian refers to the threat or actual occurrence of large scale loss of life (especially genocide), massive forced migration, and widespread abuses of human rights; it does not, however, include the overthrow of a democratically elected government, unless one of the results is large scale loss of life. As motivations are inevitably mixed, the humanitarian rationale need not be exclusive, but it should be explicit. In some of the cases, other justifications predominated – regional-security concerns in Liberia or the nature of the target regime in Haiti – but responding to the needs of populations at risk remained clearly evident.

Using these criteria, eight cases from the 1990s, summarized in Table 5.1, are treated chronologically. The table also distinguishes the nature of their authorization under three categories: those authorized by the United Nations (UN) Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter, those authorizations delegated to regional arrangements under Chapter VIII, and those not authorized by the Security Council. 3 Of the military interventions that were undertaken between 1990 and 2000, all were accompanied by sanctions and embargoes. International criminal prosecution has also been employed in several of the more recent cases.

One or both of the criteria were absent in outside military operations in several countries in the 1990s, and these operations are therefore not included here. Meaningful consent, for example, was expressed and justified the Russian military efforts in Georgia and Tajikistan and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in Tajikistan. Furthermore, these efforts were not based on explicitly humanitarian justifications. Similarly, three interventions in Africa had the consent of democratically elected governments, and again humanitarian concerns were not paramount. These were as follows: in 1998, in Guinea-Bissau, the Senegalese, Guinean, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) efforts; in 1997, in the Central African Republic, Inter-African Force to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements (MISAB); and in 1998, in Lesotho, the South African and Botswanan efforts in accordance with agreements of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). 4 Italy intervened in Albania in 1996 for humanitarian reasons, but with Tirana’s consent.

AUTHORIZATIONS FOR MILITARY INTERVENTIONS IN THE 1990s

Country

Chapter VII Authorization Delegated

No Initial Security Council Authorization

Liberia 1990–1997

ECOMOG

Northern Iraq 1991–

Coalition

Former Yugoslavia 1992–

UNPROFOR

UNOSOM II

UNITAF
Rwanda 1994–1996

UNAMIR II

Op?ration Turquoise
Haiti 1994–1997

UNMH

UNAMSIL
ECOMOG

Kosovo 1999–

KFOR

East Timor 1999–

UNAMET

INTERFET

NORTHERN IRAQ 1991–

As sanctions were progressively tightened, the US and other countries began to deploy substantial military forces in the region. By late October 1990, Iraq had occupied Kuwait for more than two months, and a consensus was emerging between the US and the Soviet Union that some form of enforcement action might be authorized by the Security Council. In the course of negotiations, a senior US State Department official was quoted as saying that [l]egally, our position and the position shared by others is that Article 51 provides a sufficient basis under international law for further action. A Council resolution authorizing some specific military action would, however, provide a firmer political basis. There was little serious discussion of establishing an independent UN force; rather, the preferred action would put coalition forces under a UN umbrella.

On a visit to Moscow in November, US Secretary of State James Baker lobbied for such a resolution, pointing to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev’s 1987 Pravda article on enhancing the UN’s role.17 Gorbachev suggested that the Council pass two resolutions: the first, adopted in late November, would authorize force after a six-week grace period; the second would provide the actual go-ahead. Baker proposed a single resolution, with a grace period before it would become operative. When he met the Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in Paris on November 18, Washington believed it had the votes for a resolution, but Moscow demurred. Among other concerns, Shevardnadze insisted that the actual word force not be used. Baker came up with five different euphemisms, finally settling on the phrase all necessary means.18

On November 29, the Security Council adopted Resolution 678 (1990) by 12 votes to 2 (Cuba and Yemen), with China abstaining. In its operative paragraph, the Security Council [a]uthorises Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 fully implements … the foregoing resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold and implement Resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area.

As the coalition commenced the air campaign that heralded Operation Desert Storm in January and February 1991, a number of states sought to bring about a last-minute peaceful resolution to the conflict. Under a plan proposed by the Soviet Union, the trade embargo on Iraq would have been lifted once two-thirds of Iraqi troops left Kuwait, with remaining sanctions to be lifted when the withdrawal was complete. The proposal was rejected by the US and the United Kingdom (UK), which asserted that they had the power to maintain sanctions for as long as they chose and to continue the war authorized by the Security Council until it adopted another resolution. As permanent members of the Council, they reserved the right to veto any such compromise.19

After a six-week air war that destroyed most of Iraq’s military capabilities and much of the country’s infrastructure, the ground war commenced on February 24, 1991. Some 500,000 coalition troops and personnel from 28 countries liberated Kuwait and occupied much of southern Iraq in only four days. Coalition forces entered Kuwait City on February 27; a cease-fire commenced at midnight on February 28.

Coalition aircraft had penetrated deep into Iraq, targeting bridges, electric plants, and infrastructure sites for other essential services. In all, they dropped more than 90,000 tons of explosives. The overwhelming superiority in air power contributed to wartime Iraqi military deaths, estimated at between 30,000 and 120,000, while several hundred died on the coalition side. Estimates suggest that 3,000 to 3,500 Iraqi civilians died during the conflict, with many more dying subsequently, owing to a combination of the damaged infrastructure and the harsh sanctions regime.20 The costs of the operation are usually estimated at $60–70 billion.

One of the more controversial humanitarian aspects of international actions against Iraq results from more than 10 years of economic sanctions. They were designed to remain in effect until two conditions were met: Iraq’s stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction were destroyed; and its treatment of minorities improved. Sanctions are still in place, as is the regime. As economic sanctions seemed to target the poor and vulnerable, without having any visible impact on the government and its policies, a new question arose: How much pain is the community of states willing to inflict on civilians in a quest for doubtful political gains?

During the military campaign against Iraq in 1991, US President George Bush publicly expressed his hope that Iraqi citizens would take matters into their own hands and remove Saddam Hussein from power. The apparently crushing defeat of the Iraqi Army and foreign support reignited the desire for independence among Kurds living in northern Iraq. Previous revolts had been brutally suppressed by Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath regime, with measures including the use of chemical weapons. On this occasion, Iraqi troops attacked Kurdish villages, forcing up to 2 million civilians to flee their homes, virtually overnight. By April 5, 1991, Turkey estimated that almost 1 million people were attempting to reach safety by crossing its borders.21

The Security Council expressed concern about the treatment of the Kurds in northern Iraq, along with the Shi’ites and Marsh Arabs in the south, at a meeting on April 3, 1991. Resolution 687 (1991) provided the terms of the cease-fire with Iraq and conditions for lifting sanctions, but conspicuously it failed to mention the plight of Iraq’s civilian population. This absence subsequently has led to debate about the legality of measures under Council Resolution 688 (1991), which was agreed on only two days later.

Resolution 688 condemned the repression of the civilian population, demanded that Iraq end it, and insisted that the country allow international humanitarian organizations immediate access to all those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq. The Council also appealed to all member states and aid organizations to contribute to these humanitarian relief efforts. The strong language of the resolution was reminiscent of Chapter VII,22 but none of the states voting for the resolution characterized it as such at the time. Washington noted that it planned to use military aircraft to drop food, blankets, clothing, tents, and other relief into northern Iraq. On the same day that the Security Council passed Resolution 688, Bush announced plans to commence aid drops to Kurds in northern Iraq in cooperation with France and the UK, emphasizing that the US would not intervene militarily in the conflict.23